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Abstract 
 
Gas security is a key factor in the European Union’s energy policy. Contractual relations based on 
long-term contracts during the 1970s and 1980s led to relative stability in energy trade between the EU 
and its gas suppliers. But since the mid-1990s, the process of opening up the EU’s gas industries to 
competition and the desire to create a single gas market has led to an in-depth reorganization of the 
sector. The EU now intends to redefine the way in which it manages its relations with its main 
suppliers, such as Russia, by attempting to impose a model based on competition, unbundling of 
network industries and privatization. Russia does not intend to implement this “EU model” in its gas 
sector, despite the big changes taking place in its domestic market. An approach based on the 
preferential use of state instruments conflicts with the multilateralism and principles of competition 
upheld by the EU. The EU’s normative power is thus in contradiction with the institutional 
environment of the Russian energy sector. It is therefore unlikely that energy relations between the EU 
and Russia will be structured solely on standards stemming from international rules and institutions. 
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The energy policy of the European Union has to a large degree been focused on structuring its 
internal market, with two main objectives: first, to liberalize network industries (electricity 
and gas) – with the purpose of opening up the markets to competition –  and, second, to create 
a single energy market to replace the twenty-seven national markets. While this approach 
might work in the electricity sector, reform is a more complex matter where gas is concerned, 
not least because of the extra dimension of the EU’s relations with its gas suppliers. The 
expected rise in gas imports over the long term as well as an increasing number of 
uncertainties mean that the EU must pay particular attention to the problem of dependence, 
and consequently of supply security. The risks involved include the volatility of oil prices, 
increased state involvement in the hydrocarbon sector of the producing countries (oil 
nationalism), and instability in some of the EU’s main gas supplier countries (Russia, Algeria) 
and transit countries (Ukraine). No real solution has yet been found as to how the EU can 
create a new gas architecture that will enable it to meet the objectives of a competitive 
internal market while maintaining stable and relatively risk-free relations with its suppliers.  
 
The EU’s reliance on external gas suppliers is not new. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
contractual relations based on long-term contracts produced relative stability in energy 
trading. With the liberalization of the EU’s gas industries and the desire to create a single gas 
market, this trade pattern is being destabilized. Risks and benefits along the gas value chain 
are being redistributed, creating fresh uncertainties both for consumers and producers. In this 
changing environment, the EU is seeking to redefine its contractual relations with its main 
suppliers by exporting its acquis communautaires and attempting to impose an energy model 
based on competition, spot markets, de-integration of network industries and privatization. 
Today, the EU is faced with a fundamental question. Are the internal rules, standards and 
regulations generated by the two gas directives and reinforced by the Third Energy Package 
sufficient on their own to secure a stable gas supply for the EU? Can they guarantee the 
security of the EU’s external gas supply?  
 
The analysis presented here of the differences and conflicts between the EU and one of its 
main suppliers, Russia, will help shed some light on this question. We will show that while 
the liberalization process challenges the EU’s relations with its suppliers, it does not really 
come up with an alternative “model” that might guarantee energy stability and security. Our 
aim here is to analyze the gas conflicts between the UE and Russia by viewing them as the 
result of the confrontation of different models that structure the natural gas industries of these 
two countries. The purpose is not to examine the efficiency of each model (for example by 
analyzing transaction costs) but to show that they have become established because of the 
presence of different institutional environments. It may emerge that the development of 
markets of a different nature and maturity require different structures of governance instead of 
a single market design (Correljé, 2006). This article adopts a multi-level approach as 
developed by new institutional economics (Williamson, 2000; Dixit, 2009). First we shall 
attempt to define the two gas industry organization models concerned, namely that of the EU 
and that of Russia. Second, we shall try to explain how the conflicts of interest that are 
emerging in the natural gas trading relations between the two regions are the product of the 
confrontation of these two different models. 
 
I –EU-Russia: two organizational “models” for the natural gas industry 
 
Gas trading relations between the EU and Russia can be characterized as interdependent. 
Since the end of the 1990s, these relations have however become established in a special 
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context characterized by the confrontation of two organizational and institutional models. 
These “gas models” must be understood in terms of their coherence/complementarity in 
relation to the institutional environment in which they are integrated. Institutional coherence 
and complementarity are two concepts developed by neo-institutionalist theory (North 2005; 
Hopner 2005). According to the concept of institutional complementarity, the functioning of 
an institution is conditioned by interactions with other institutions (Höpner, 2005). Attention 
has focused on the complementarity links between the institutional environment and the 
choice of an appropriate governance structure. Aside from the question of efficiency1, we may 
consider that Russian gas reform based on de-integration of the main gas company and 
complete unbundling (as in the EU) has little credibility.  
 
1.1 Interdependence and divergent interests: security of supply versus security of 
demand 
 
While there is strong interdependence in gas trading relations between the EU and Russia, 
there are also a certain number of conflicts of interest. On the one hand, the EU is seeking to 
secure its gas supply, both in terms of volume and price, while on the other Russia is seeking 
to secure “gas demand” which depends not only on quantities but also on prices2.  
 
Today, 70% of the gas consumed in the EU is imported. With the gradual depletion of gas 
reserves in the North Sea and the Netherlands and the expected rise in gas consumption in the 
EU, this figure will increase and, according to certain scenarios (Criqui et al. 2010), will reach 
between 80 and 96% by 2040. However, since the share of natural gas in the energy mix of 
each member country is variable, the volumes imported will also vary. The biggest importers 
of natural gas in the EU are, in descending order, Germany, Italy, the UK, France, Spain, 
Portugal and Belgium. The Herfindhal-Hirschman index and the Shannon-Wiener index3 
show that the EU’s gas procurement sources are extremely concentrated, dominated by just a 
handful of suppliers who have a significant market share. Europe’s energy vulnerability is 
thus considerable (Clastres and Locatelli 2012). But the situation varies widely with each 
member state. According to the Shannon-Wiener index, Central and Eastern European 
countries (Poland, Hungary, Romania), as well as the Baltic countries (for example Lithuania) 
and Finland are high on the energy vulnerability scale, given the predominance of a single 
supplier, Russia. On the other hand, countries such as France, Germany and Italy import 
significant amounts of gas but are less vulnerable because they have several suppliers, a 
particularly important factor in the event that a producer might interrupt supplies. 
 
In consequence, the security and reliability of gas supply is today a central theme in the 
European Union’s energy policy. The debate regarding the EU’s gas security is essentially 
                                                          
1 According to E. Brousseau, P. Garrouste and E. Raynaud (2011), “(…) a competitive selection among 
institutional solutions does not systematically eliminate costly governance structures (…)”. 
 
2. A number of more or less inclusive definitions of the concept of energy security have been proposed (Kruyt et 
al. 2009; Sovacool and Mukherjee 2011). The International Energy Agency (2001) gives a fairly restrictive 
definition that has since been widely used in the economic literature (Winzer, 2011). This concept refers to “the 
physical availability of supplies to satisfy demand at a given price”. The definition includes a physical 
dimension, in other words the reliability of the source and the volumes available, as well as an economic 
dimension linked to prices and their volatility. 
 
3 The Herfindhal-Hirschman index attempts to measure market concentration while the Shannon-Wiener index 
measures the diversity of importers. 
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focused on Russia given its share of the market. Russia supplies the EU with 40% of its gas 
imports. But the dependence of each individual country on Russian gas varies widely. Spain 
has zero dependence, while Central European countries have a dependence rate of 70%, with 
this figure reaching 100% for the Baltic States, a consequence of trade relations that were 
forged by the former Soviet Union and the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(cf. Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Dependence of certain EU countries on Russian gas 
 
Country Volume Gm3 
Gazprom’s share of import 
market, % 
Germany 34.1 36.7 
Austria 5.4 51.0 
Belgium 3.3 15.3 
Bulgaria 2.5 100.0 
Estonia 0.7 100.0 
Finland 4.2 100.0 
France 8.5 18.2 
Greece 2.9 78.9 
Italy 17.1 24.6 
Latvia 1.2 100.0 
Lithuania 3.2 100.0 
Hungary 6.3 85.0 
Poland 10.3 86.1 
Czech Republic 8.2 57.5 
Romania 3.2 100.0 
United Kingdom 12.9 26.6 
Sources: Calculated on basis of Gazprom’s Report, 2011, Moscow; BP Energy statistical review, 2011 
 
At the same time, 70.8% of Russia’s total gas exports go to the EU. Europe is Russia’s largest 
gas export market. It also exports significant amounts to the CIS countries while gas exports 
to Asia are currently relatively low. But most importantly, the EU is a profitable market for 
Russia and its state-controlled company, especially when compared with the domestic market 
where most natural gas is sold at government-regulated tariffs (Boussena and Locatelli 2011). 
According to data published by Gazprom (2011), the average price of natural gas sold on the 
Russian market in 2010 was $77/1,000 m3 compared with a price of $244/1,000 m3 on the 
European market. The Russian economy depends on foreign currency earnings from its 
hydrocarbon exports (oil and gas) to balance its budget and help boost economic growth. 
Russsia’s main objective, therefore, where the EU is concerned is to ensure the security of 
demand, both in terms of volume and price. (Tonje and De Jong 2007; Mansson et al. 2012). 
Consequently, recent developments in the European gas market, whether of an economic 
nature (uncertainty of EU demand) or institutional (new market liberalization regulations), are 
seen by Russia as a possible threat to its relations with the EU. In particular, the exporting 
countries feel that the supply security issues that are preoccupying importing countries must 
not overshadow their own interest of security of demand. Any analysis of gas security must 
take into account the interests of all the stakeholders, that is to say, exporters, importers and 
transit countries.  
 
1.2 The EU model: competition and de-integration  
 
The liberalization of EU gas markets driven by the gas directives of 1998 and 2003, then by 
the third energy package of 2009, implies a major organizational and institutional 
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transformation of the gas industry in the EU countries. The aim of the EU reforms is two-fold: 
one the one hand to create a competitive market to replace hierarchical and administrative 
coordination mechanisms (Glachant and Perez, 2007), and, on the other, to establish a single 
gas market to replace the twenty-seven national markets. The process involves de-integration 
of national monopolies along with third-party access (TPA) in segments of an industry where 
transmission/distribution operates as a natural monopoly.  
 
Liberalization will result in greater competition among suppliers and more spot market sales 
and short-term transactions. It may be considered that opening the European gas market to 
competition tends to increase risks along the gas value chain (Clingendael International 
Energy Programme 2008). In a more competitive European market, the distribution of volume 
and price risks (as well as the rent) between the producer and the consumer will also change. 
 
- System of governance: rule of law and multilateralism 
 
The EU has mainly based management of its relations with gas suppliers on dissemination of 
its acquis regarding the regulation and organization of energy markets (McGowan, 2007). The 
aim is to establish a common, regulatory space, governed by standards and rules guiding the 
behaviour of market players. The organization model exported by the acquis hinges on de-
integrated network industries, associated with competitive modalities for access to 
hydrocarbon resources established by the principles set forth in the Energy Charter.  
 
By diffusing the acquis in the gas producing countries (in particular Russia) the EU could 
enhance its gas supply security since it would be able test the liberalization process along the 
entire gas chain (from upstream to downstream). The coherence of its reforms would thus be 
strengthened. The emergence of a certain number of gas companies in Russia that could 
potentially export gas and thus compete on the European market would increase the liquidity 
of spot markets and enhance their credibility. Competition among Russian producers would 
provide the EU with an opportunity – albeit very specific – for diversifying its supply sources 
and thus ensuring its gas security. Finally, diffusion of the acquis by means of the transit 
protocol of the Energy Charter Treaty4 would also help improve supply security for the EU by 
promoting diversification of supply. This protocol could provide a legal framework for 
opening up Gazprom’s pipeline network to foreign suppliers. If Gazprom were to adhere to 
the basic principle of “freedom of transit” by allowing third-party access to its transmission 
networks, gas companies would have the opportunity to ship gas from Central Asia to Europe, 
which would increase the number of suppliers on the European market.  
 
Market institutions and the rule of law in a framework of international relations based on 
multilateralism are supposed to produce stability and security. They are central elements in 
the governance structure of the network industries competitive model put in place by the EU. 
This approach is in harmony with the institutions of the EU and no doubt with the incomplete 
nature of Europe’s integration (Bressand, 2012). The visions and often divergent interests of 
member states in energy matters makes it difficult to create a real foreign policy regarding 
energy (Finon and Locatelli, 2008). In this situation, as Majone (1993) points out, the only 
way of achieving greater political integration would be by seeking integration through the 
market. 
 
                                                          
4 The Energy Charter transit protocol (2000) specifies pipeline access conditions. It defines the principles for 
determining transit tariffs, available capacity and unauthorised taking of energy products during transit. 
 
6 
 
1.3 The Russian model: a “dual” gas market  
 
The governance structure must be aligned with the institutional environment. The model for 
the organization of the gas industry, underpinned by the imposition of the EU energy acquis, 
would involve complex, large-scale changes to the structure of the Russian gas sector. But 
such changes are ill suited to Russia’s economic and institutional environment, particularly 
due to the inefficiency of certain institutions such as taxation, contracting and property rights 
(Rossiaud and Locatelli, 2009). From this point of view, the “Gazprom model”, a hierarchical 
type of governance structure, is the organizational and institutional form that enables non-
monetary relations and low energy prices to be best managed.  
 
- Vertical integration and competition 
 
The Russian gas structure governance is characterized by the presence of the State financial 
holding Gazprom. With monopoly control over transmission and exports, the company enjoys 
dominant market power in Russia, accounting for 78% of gas production. Furthermore, due to 
the low gas prices on the domestic market, the regulatory measures governing the industry 
mainly concern quantities, with Gazprom and the main categories of consumers negotiating 
delivery quotas in the domestic market. Profits and costs are relatively minor concerns 
(Ahrend and Tompson, 2004). The idea of introducing a liberal governance structure such as 
that tried out in the oil sector (Rossiaud 2012) was the subject of recurrent debate throughout 
the 1990s, as can be seen from the various reform proposals. The question of the poor 
alignment (as defined by Brousseau et al, 2011) of a liberal governance structure with 
Russia’s institutional environment led to the establishment of a hierarchical governance 
structure. 
 
The hierarchical governance structure is consistent with the emergence of competitive fringes 
in specific segments of the Russian gas market. The dual market is characterized by regulated 
prices on the one hand and free market prices on the other (Ahrend and Tompson 2004)5. The 
purpose of competition is two-fold. First, it acts in a fairly conventional manner to help 
discipline the behaviour of Gazprom, the dominant market player. Second, the presence of 
competitors enables the State to reduce information asymmetry in its relations with Gazprom, 
which has long been seen as a State within the State. The second important feature is the strict 
control by the federal authorities over access to resources, for both national and international 
players. The third feature concerns gas exportations. Gazprom may encounter competition in 
its home market, but the authorities are reluctant to see it obliged to compete with other 
Russian companies in the European market. Gazprom should keep its monopoly of exports on 
European market to avoid contributing to lower prices on European spot markets and thus 
eroding Russia’s monopoly profits on gas exports (Tarr, 2010). 
 
- System of governance: State company and bilateral relations 
 
The governance system in place is based essentially on State-controlled companies (or public 
property rights) inserted in a system of bilateral relations, which is in contradiction with the 
multilateralism promoted by the EU. State-controlled companies can serve as a 
remedy/substitute for the shortcomings of the market institutional arrangements in a rent 
                                                          
5 Two other categories of players can be identified alongside Gazprom. In the first category are the independent 
producers, which are generally private companies that received some of the exploration and production licences 
at the time of the gas sector reform in 1992. The second category is the Russian oil companies. 
 
7 
 
sector, taking into account the particular features of the Russian institutional environment. In 
fact, if the authorities have direct control over the public companies the State can use 
hierarchical coordination in order to impose its preferences regarding exploration and 
depletion rates. The State companies can also be an important complement to contractual 
relations. In particular, a public oil and gas company can help improve the way in which 
information is shared between the State and operators. This reduction in information 
asymmetry and ex post monitoring costs may be an important condition for the effectiveness 
of contractual arrangements. This is particularly true where fiscal instruments are concerned 
(Locatelli and Rossiaud, 2011a). The competition is emerging as an essential institution of the 
reform. From this point of view, the competition between the two main State companies, 
Rosneft and Gazprom, is a specificity of the Russian reform. 
 
The second salient feature of the governance structure is related to the type of cooperation set 
up between State-owned companies and international oil companies. The State-owned oil and 
gas companies are the sole owners of exploration and production licences in the geographical 
areas covered by the partnership agreements. The cooperation between international oil and 
gas companies and State-owned companies is the principle of reciprocity known as “assets for 
assets” (Belyi, 2009).   
 
Table 2: Organization models and Systems of governance  
 
EU Russia 
Competitive gas market 
 
- Vertical de-integration: Unbundling 
- Third Party access 
- Spot markets and hub 
Dual gas market 
 
- Hierarchical governance structure with 
competitive fringe 
- Vertical integration 
- Export monopoly 
System of governance  
 
-Rule of Law 
-Multilateralism 
System of governance  
 
- State company 
- Asset swapping and bilateral relations 
 
II – Conflicts between Russia and the EU: importance of the two governance structures  
 
The way in which the two parties seek to attain their economic objectives according to their 
particular organization and values has created a certain number of conflicts. They concern 
three main questions: the contractual relations between the gas companies, vertical integration 
of players, and access to hydrocarbon resources. Profound differences are emerging in the 
position of Russia and the EU concerning these three issues. The new architecture of the 
European gas market cannot afford to disregard this institutional conflict, but must on the 
contrary strike a balance between competition and security. 
 
2.1 Contractual relations: the stakes of the long-term take-or-pay contract 
 
The two organizational and institutional forms have important implications for the type of gas 
trading contracts that can be envisaged between the companies of the parties in question. The 
interdependence between the EU and its natural gas suppliers has been structured by a 
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specific kind of contractual relation based on long-term take-or-pay contracts and their 
different clauses. Generally speaking, long-term contracts can be justified by the specificity of 
the assets involved, especially in relation to transmission. Transaction cost theory and the 
incomplete contract theory conclude that asset specificity can lead to hold-up problems given 
the potential for opportunist behaviour from the parties involved (Williamson 1985). In 
particular, the risk of ex post opportunism may cause the parties to underinvest. Complex 
institutional arrangements can help alleviate these problems (Nicita and Pagano 2004). Long-
term TOP contracts fall into this category of incentives. There has been an abundance of 
literature on the subject of long-terms TOP contracts, especially in relation to the US natural 
gas industry (Creti and Villeneuve 2004; Hubbard and Weiner 1986 and 1991; Mulherin 
1986). Contracts of this type were first implemented in Europe by the Netherlands in the 
1960s and were characterized by their long duration (20-30 years) and by a certain number of 
clauses such as the take-or-pay clause. They have enabled stable mature gas supply systems to 
be developed in Europe and provided the guarantees needed for the development of the huge 
gas fields in Western Siberia, Urengoy and Yamburg (Boussena 1999). Today, they are a 
major source of conflict between the EU and Russia. 
 
- Long-term contracts and competition 
 
It is from the viewpoint of the principles of competition (anti-trust laws) advocated by the EU 
since its decision to liberalize its markets and in relation to market partitioning that long-term 
contracts are currently at the centre of a debate that is still by no means closed (Hautecloque 
and Glachant 2011). A few issues in particular should be highlighted. Generally speaking, 
long-term contracts are major barriers to the entry of potential new market players. One of the 
main problems is the risk of foreclosure caused by the behaviour of the dominant player. 
Long-term contracts thus hinder the development of the liquidity needed in spot markets 
(Hautecloque and Glachant 2011; Percebois 2008). A number of clauses in TOP contracts 
have therefore been called into question and some have now been removed. The final 
destination clause, the territorial restriction clause and the use restriction clause create entry 
barriers, partition markets, limit their size and are an encouragement to collusion among 
vendors and inhibit competition in the downstream sector (Nyssens et al. 2004; Hirschhausen 
and Neuman 2008). Other contractual provisions, such as profit-sharing mechanisms, are felt 
to have a similar effect since they make resale of gas economically less attractive or simply 
unfeasible (Nyssens and Osbone 2005). As a result, such clauses can no longer be included in 
natural gas supply contracts. However, the matter is still under discussion as far as LNG 
contracts are concerned. Central to the debate is how to find a trade-off between flexibility 
and opportunism in contracts (Crocker and Masten 1991).  
 
In attempting to assess the effect of long-term contracts on its competition policy, the EU 
must take into account not only the structure of the market but also the types of companies 
involved in trading relations. The question of competition raises the problem of market 
concentration and implicitly that of the dominant position (and thus market power) of a single 
firm. From this point of view, Russia, through its state-controlled company Gazprom, is seen 
as a specific risk by the EU for a number of reasons. As a result of trading relations 
established under the former Soviet Union, Gazprom has a huge market share (and is more 
than a dominant player) in certain economies, for example the Baltic states, Hungary, Poland 
and Bulgaria. Such a market share is seen as a proxy for market power, and in the presence of 
long-term contracts this could lead to a certain number of anti-competitive effects 
(foreclosure, excessively high prices …). Gazprom’s profile – a company vertically integrated 
on its domestic market, with a transmission and export monopoly, majority state-ownership 
9 
 
(51%) and ambitions to gain a foothold in the downstream market in Europe – is the second 
factor used by the EU to justify its perception of a “Russian risk”. Finally, Russian legislation 
limiting foreign investment in the development and production of Russian gas reserves is 
hampering attempts by European companies to get involved in this part of the chain and is 
thus adding to the perceived risks and uncertainties associated with this country (Locatelli and 
Rossiaud 2011b). Admittedly, one way of achieving gas supply security might indeed be 
through direct involvement in hydrocarbon production development. 
 
- Long-term contracts: sharing price and volume risks in an asset-specific industry 
 
Russia’s main concern, however, is the substantial financing that is needed to invest in the 
renewal of Gazprom’s production capacity. A way of securing such financing is to ensure that 
Gazprom has long-term guaranteed demand on its profitable export markets. This can be 
achieved through long-term TOP contracts. From a first interpretation, TOP contracts can be 
seen as a way of sharing the risks related to price and volumes between producer and 
consumer along the entire gas value chain, notably through the price indexation clause and 
clauses governing flexibility and minimum take-off volumes (Boussena, 1999). Where the 
supply side is concerned, these contracts provide incentives for players to make asset-specific 
investments (Nicita and Pagano 2004). The link between the take-or-pay clause and decisions 
to invest in production capacity is well established (Crocker and Masten 1991). TOP clauses 
ensure that substantial investment is made in production and transmission, and especially in 
export infrastructure. The producer effectively has a guarantee that the volumes produced will 
be sold. Where prices are concerned, indexation of natural gas prices to those of energies 
competing with gas in final energy consumption sources provides consumers with protection 
against price risks (Konoplyanik 2010). Importers have a guarantee that the price of gas will 
remain competitive with that of alternative energy sources, which in the 1970s and 1980s was 
oil. A second interpretation considers these contracts to be a mechanism for implementing 
incentives to improve contract performance (Masten and Crocker 1985). Finally, TOP 
contracts represent an opportunity to eliminate externalities such as problems of free riding  
 
Changes to the duration of long-term contracts and to certain clauses – and even the 
possibility of removing some provisions – can create major uncertainties for Gazprom, who 
would no longer have a contractually guaranteed demand for the long term. It would instead 
have to compete on spot markets. Gazprom has constantly reiterated its preference for long-
term TOP contracts, maintaining that they are needed to finance the considerable investment 
required to renew production capacity, and in particular to develop the fields in Yamal 
province. Until such contracts are signed with EU countries Gazprom has put its strategic 
investments on hold, creating uncertainties regarding the evolution of future output (Boussena 
and Locatelli 2011). 
 
2.2 Price formation: spot prices versus a hybrid pricing system  
 
The conflicts between the EU and Russia – and negotiations between European firms and 
Gazprom – hinge essentially on prices and the indexation formulas used in long-term 
contracts to calculate these prices. A hybrid pricing system prevails in the EU (Clingendael 
International Energy Programme, 2008), marked by two rationales for the formation of 
natural-gas prices: one based on spot markets where the price results from the confrontation 
of supply and demand; the other on long-term contracts. In the second case prices have 
traditionally been indexed to the price of crude oil or refined products. In practice the two 
price systems are not completely separate, but since 2008 gas prices in long-term contracts 
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and on spot markets have been subject to substantial decoupling. The prices of natural gas and 
LNG on European spot markets have plummeted due to the over-abundance of gas caused by 
the economic crisis and shale gas. At the same time, the prices in TOP contracts have kept 
pace with the rising trend in crude oil and refined-product prices.  
 
Diagram 1: Natural gas price trends in Europe 
 
 
Source: Gas Matters, various years 
 
These trends are fuelling a growing debate on the relevance of maintaining oil-indexed gas 
prices in long-term contracts, as illustrated by the current controversy between S. Komlev, of 
the Contract Structuring and Pricing Directorate at Gazprom Export, who is in favour of oil-
indexed pricing, and J. Stern and H. Rogers, of the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, who 
oppose it (Komlev, 2013; Stern and Rogers, 2013). 
 
- Economic debate 
 
The main argument cited by opponents of indexation of the price of gas in long-term contracts 
to that of oil is that conditions in the gas market – supply and demand (spot markets) – should 
determine natural-gas prices. Moreover, they add, the two markets are very different, in terms 
of their organization, reserves, and forecast demand. Lastly, competition between the two 
types of energy provides less and less justification for indexing prices to oil. Gas is no longer 
competing with oil, but with coal and electricity. The opponents of indexation consequently 
advocate using the price of natural gas on spot markets as a baseline, rather than the price of 
oil products. 
 
On the other hand, various reasons have been advanced to justify indexing prices to oil. 
Several derive from the problem of the limited liquidity6 of most EU spot markets and 
                                                          
6 The liquidity of a gas hub can be defined as the ratio between the total volume of trade on the hub and the 
volume of gas consumed in the area served by the hub. 
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consequently of the marker price. Overall, the reliability of prices decided by spot markets is 
one of the main constraints holding back their use in indexation formulas for long-term 
contracts (Frisch, 2010). For a spot price fixed at a particular hub to become a marker price, 
the hub must offer, among other attributes, the necessary depth, liquidity and transparency, 
and consequently be able to attract a significant number of market players (Heather, 2012). 
The marker price issue relates directly to that of the price-setting hub that might be suitable as 
a basis for price-indexation formulas (Stern, 2007). For the time being Britain’s National 
Balancing Point (NBP) is the only hub with sufficient liquidity. But can it serve as a 
benchmark for mainland Europe, given the differences in the various gas markets?  
Given the poor liquidity of spot markets there is good cause to fear manipulation of prices 
through coordinated agreements between dominant producers. By banking on low growth in 
gas production and exports, they would be able to push spot-market prices up, a strategy 
which could not possibly work with conventional TOP contracts (Boussena and Locatelli, 
2011). The launch of the Gas Forum and the efforts of some of its members to promote the 
institution of an Opec-type organization for gas, in order to restrict output volume and boost 
prices, fits into this rationale7. This would give Russia, in view of its importance in supplying 
the EU, substantial market power. In contrast, indexing such contracts to the price of oil 
products makes it impossible for a single player to influence prices, and eliminates the 
incentive to do so. There remains the problem of volatile spot prices. One of the arguments 
generally put forward in favour of continued indexation to oil products is the stability this 
practice induces.  
 
- Position of gas companies: opposition between Gazprom and European companies 
  
The changes that have been taking place in the European gas market could call into question 
Gazprom’s stance with regard to its contractual conditions, and at the very least may force the 
company to agree to certain amendments, including renegotiating long-term contracts in order 
to add greater flexibility and preserve its market shares. As is the case for all gas producers, 
the company must find a new balance between prices and volumes. Scope for integrating spot 
prices in price-indexation formulas is a key issue in negotiations between Gazprom and some 
of its European customers8. It will also be necessary to renegotiate the minimum quantities to 
be taken under the terms of the TOP contracts in light of the reduction in demand on the 
European markets. 
 
Gazprom continues firmly to oppose significant changes in the indexation formula itself. But 
it has lost a large market share. In 2012 its gas exports to Europe fell by 5.5% while Norway 
saw a rise in its export volumes. This drop in the company’s sales to Europe can be blamed on 
its strategy of defending prices to the detriment of volumes. On average the selling price of 
Russian gas to Europe was $402/1000 m3 (that is a rise of 5%)9. The company has attempted 
to maintain a certain level of competitiveness in relation to spot prices for natural gas by 
agreeing to negotiate lower prices in its long-term contracts with its principal clients, but 
seemingly without fundamentally changing the price indexation formula. In 2012 the 
                                                          
7 First gas OPEC meeting. EU Energy, n° 231, 23 April 2010. 
 
8 The Price Review and Price Re-opener clauses are two mechanisms that were introduced in the 1980s to 
increase flexibility and open the way for renegotiating prices in long-term contracts. These provisions introduced 
the possibility of adjusting the price formula, making them an important part of the risk-sharing arrangements 
between importer and exporter (Wäktare 2007; Frisch 2010).  
 
9 International Gas report, n° 718, 25 Feb. 2013. 
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company paid a total of $2.7 billion to the European gas companies concerned, and this could 
rise to $4.7 billion for 201310. 
 
2.3 Vertical integration and access to hydrocarbon resources 
 
The question of vertical integration and its effects on competition is at the heart of the conflict 
between the EU and Russia over their gas trading relations. The EU argues that foreclosure 
strategies and related anti-competition practices are possible because of the absence of 
effective unbundling of production and transmission networks11. The vertically integrated 
model much favoured by Gazprom, especially at the international level, is thus at odds with 
the logic of ownership unbundling that the EU intends to implement to remedy these 
problems. The measures Gazprom intends to deploy to maintain its market share in a 
competitive environment hinge mainly on a strategy of downstream integration in the 
European market (Locatelli, 2008 ; cf. Table 2). Such integration would ensure that it can 
market its resources without having to compete with other gas producers in a wholesale 
market (Eikeland, 2007). This strategy would also enable Gazprom, in its position as an 
oligopoly, to reap profit in local competition for direct sales to industrial and residential 
customers, taking advantage of the fact that they are less sensitive to fluctuating prices. This 
strategy fulfils one of the priority goals of Russian energy policy: to endow Russia with large, 
international hydrocarbon companies, capable of competing with the world’s leading majors. 
But according to the EU, the gas company is attempting to achieve vertical integration as part 
of a strategy enabling it to manipulate the competitive rationale brought about by the gas 
directives.  
 
Table 3: The main stakes held by Gazprom in joint ventures with EU partners, and its 
main European subsidiaries 
 
 Company 
Austria 
The Russian firm will market gas directly 
through a joint subsidiary, GWH, and Centrex 
(in which Gazprom holds a 25% share) 
Hungary 
Acquisition of share in E.ON Foldag Storage 
and E.ON Foldaz and in regional gas and 
electricity suppliers as part of a deal with E.ON 
concerning its holdings in MOL 
Italy 
Possibility of acquisition of 10% stake in 
Enipower with direct sales of gas for electricity 
production 
Poland 
Until 2011 a joint venture between PGNiG, of 
Poland, and Gazprom to operate the Yamal gas 
pipeline in Poland 
United Kingdom 
Acquisition of share in gas distributor Pennine 
Natural Gas (PNG) 
 Acquisition of Natural Gas Shipping Services (NGSS) 
 Gazprom subsidiary, Gazprom Marketing and 
                                                          
10 These companies are E.ON-Rurhgas (Germany), PGNiG (Poland), DONG (Denmark), ENI (Italy) and 
Econgas (Austria). 
 
11 Direct access to end-users would also enable a company to avoid competition in wholesale markets strategies 
and increase supply costs for its downstream competitors (Hansen and Percebois, 2010). 
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Trading, for direct sales of Russian gas in the 
UK 
Estonia 
Purchase of a 37.5% share in Eesti Gaas, a 
marketing and transmission company 
Latvia 
Purchase of a 34% share in Latvijas Gaze, a 
marketing and distribution company 
Lithuania 
Purchase of a 30% share in Stella Vitae, a 
transmission and distribution company 
 Purchase of a 37% share in Lietuvos Dujos, a marketing and transmission company 
 
Some of the rules in the Third Energy Package will seek to restrict this type of adaptation 
through downstream integration. Such rules could significantly hinder Gazprom investments 
in the EU. In particular, opposition between the two parties focuses on the third-country 
clause, sometimes described as an anti-Gazprom clause. Coupled with ownership unbundling 
this clause blocks the gas company’s downstream-integration strategy and opens the way for 
discrimination against foreign investment. These rules make it impossible for a foreign 
producer and supplier such as Russia to hold a majority share in EU transmission networks or 
to act as a Transmission System Operator in a member state (Willems et al. 2010)12.  
 
- The question concerning access to hydrocarbon resources 
 
This debate on vertical integration can be extended to the crucial question of access to the 
hydrocarbon resources of the producing countries, more specifically those of Russia. The EU 
and Russian models differ with regard to how this access can be achieved. Gaining access to 
resources in producing countries is the strategic objective of the Energy Charter. This 
multilateral investment treaty (Wälde, 2008) guarantees the possibility for European gas 
companies to invest in the development of hydrocarbon resources of producers (European 
Commission, 2010). The Energy Charter offers guarantees for international investments and 
imposes non-discriminatory competitive conditions regarding access to hydrocarbon 
resources, as well as incorporation of certain WTO clauses, such as the most favoured nation 
clause (Haghighi, 2007). The principle of State sovereignty over natural resources is not as 
such called into question by the Charter. However, the rules pertaining to non discrimination 
are not without repercussions.  
 
There is no law against access by foreign investors to Russia’s hydrocarbon resources – 
witness the recent agreements (ExxonMobil-Rosneft, ENI-Rosneft, Statoil-Rosneft and Total-
Gazprom). But the modalities of such access – involvement of international investors through 
a joint venture with a state-owned company and asset swaps – do not comply with the 
competitive rationale upheld by the EU. They allow access to resources through bilateral 
relations between gas or oil companies, with the support or even involvement of states. This 
kind of policy based on reciprocity implemented by Russia with certain European states 
(Germany, Italy, France, and even the UK), is in total contradiction with the multilateralism 
promoted by the EU and backed by the Energy Charter. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Re-negotiation of the gas transit contract between Poland and Russia is an illustration of the implications of 
these rules. The Polish section of the Yamal gas pipeline, previously operated by EurRoPol Gaz, jointly owned 
by PGNiG of Poland and Gazprom, is now in the hands of the Polish operator Gaz-System. 
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Table 4: Conflicting “values” of EU and Russia 
 
EU  Russia 
 Main objective  
Ensure security of supply  Ensure security of demand 
 Means  
 Contractual relations  
Short term transaction, Spot 
transactions 
 Long-term TOP contracts  
 Price  
Spot price: confrontation 
Supply-Demand 
 Hybrid pricing system 
 Organizational structure  
Vertical unbundling  Vertical integration in the 
downstream sector 
 Access to hydrocarbon 
resources 
 
Multilateral investment system  State control  
 EU-Russia relations  
Exporting of acquis 
communautaires: to create an 
Energy market with the 
producers 
 Bilateral relations 
 
* * * 
 
Liberalization of the EU gas industry has cast doubt on the contractual relations established 
between the industry and its main suppliers, at a time of growing dependence on gas imports. 
The EU is looking for a new gas model, defining the conditions of domestic operations based 
on competitive wholesale markets and stable contractual relations with foreign suppliers. 
Such are the conditions for European gas security. From this point of view, it seems unlikely 
that the EU can manage these relations with the rules and standards set forth in the two gas 
directives and the Third Energy Package. These rules and standards run counter to the 
institutional environment of some of its main incumbent suppliers, primarily Russia. The 
EU’s economic and institutional model for gas is proving difficult to apply to this country. 
Renewed state control of the Russian hydrocarbon industry has put the sector back on its feet 
and given it new momentum, but this may be wholly at odds with the multilateral approach 
and competitive principles advocated by the EU Energy Charter. The challenge now is to try 
to work out common approaches that can satisfy the concerns and objectives of both parties.  
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